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ARTICLES
GLOBAL WARMING AND CLIMATE CHANGE-AN





The Earth's atmosphere is being changed at an unprecedented rate, primarily by
humanity's ever-expanding energy consumption, and these changes represent a
major threat to global health and security. Sound policies must be quickly devel-
oped and implemented to provide for the protection of the planet's
atmosphere ....
. . . The first steps in developing international law and practices to address pol-
lution of the air have already been taken: in the Trail Smelter arbitration of
1935 and 1938; Principle 21 of the 1972 Declaration of the UN Conference on
the Environment; the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) Convention on
the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its Protocol for sulphur reduc-
tions (Helsinki, 1985); Part XII of the Law of the Sea Convention; and the Vi-
enna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its Montreal Proto-
col (1987).
These are important first steps and should be actively implemented and respected
by all nations. There is, however, no overall convention constituting a compre-
hensive international frarhework that can address the interrelated problems of
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the global atmosphere, or issues of climate change.'
INTRODUCTION
Global warming, caused by the build-up in the atmosphere of carbon
dioxide (C0 2) and other "greenhouse gases," presents a grave risk to
the international community,2 and to both the life-sustaining environ-
ment of our planet and the essence of international law and institutions.
Global warming is pervasive in its causes and devastating in its ex-
pected impacts, therefore demanding global cooperation and global so-
lutions involving all of international society.3 In contrast, traditional in-
ternational law conceives of the international community more
narrowly by focusing primarily on sovereign states while excluding cor-
porations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals."
This problem is compounded by the difficulty of assessing and respond-
ing to global environmental risks, determining the degree of scientific
certainty needed to assess the probability that global warming is in fact
occurring,5 and identifying and measuring the expected impacts of
1. THE CHANGING ATMOSPHERE: IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL SECURITY (July 5,
1988), held in Toronto, Canada on June 27-30, 1988, reprinted in SELECTED LEGAL
MATERIALS, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 515, paras. 16-17 (1990) [hereinafter To-
RONTO CONFERENCE STATEMENT].
2. See id. para. 1 (stating that the consequences of global warming "could be sec-
ond only to a global nuclear war"); see also INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GLOBAL
WARMING AND CLIMATE CHANGE: PERSPECTIVES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, held
in New Delhi, India on Feb. 21-23, 1989 reprinted in SELECTED LEGAL MATERIALS 5
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 543, para. 1.1 (1990) [hereinafter TATA CONFERENCE
STATEMENT] (stating that "[g]lobal warming is the greatest crisis ever faced collec-
tively by humankind; unlike other earlier crisis, it is global in nature, threatens the very
survival of civilization, and promises to throw up only losers over the entire interna-
tional socio-economic fabric").
3. See P. ALLOTT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE WORLD 18 (1989) (defining the term "international society," as it
is used throughout this article). Professor Allott refers to international society as
[t]he society of the whole human race and the society of all societies. In other
words, everything human that happens in the world is part of the social process
of international society. We, the people, are members of international soci-
ety-as are all the countless subordinate societies that we form, including,
among others, the family, the industrial and commercial corporation, the State-
societies, and non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations.
Id.
4. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (3d ed.
1979) (presenting a traditional definition of the international community).
5. See J. Firor, Heating Up of the Climate (Feb. 4, 1989) (unpublished paper
presented at the Doman Colloquium on International Law and Global Change, Univer-
sity of Colorado School of Law) (discussing the greenhouse effect). The paper states:
[The] greenhouse effect is one of the better understood features of the atmo-
sphere and climate. . . .[The various numerical models of the climate] all agree
in showing that the continued increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
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global warming.6 Another hurdle is the difficulty of defining and deter-
mining concepts of liability, responsibility, and illegality for ensuring
adequate compensation for the measurable harmful impacts of global
warming.
These uncertainties are forcing the international community to make
difficult decisions regarding responses needed to counter the looming
threat of global warming. The choice appears to be between adopting a
precautionary approach today,7 one that will be very expensive and that
may itself alter society in fundamental ways, or waiting for the results
of the current "experiment," and suffer the cataclysm that could result
from making the wrong guess-a planet warming so rapidly that life
may not be able to adapt.
The choice seems clear: international society does not have the lux-
ury of waiting for scientific certainty before it responds to the potential
threat of global warming. The international community must construct
a global precautionary agreement to first, reduce emission of green-
house gases to a safe level and second, to ensure that future develop-
ment becomes sustainable.8 This requires the participation and cooper-
ation of all elements of international society working together to
achieve such an agreement fast enough to avoid the most severe im-
pacts of global warming, including sea-level rise. In the more developed
will result in a rapid heating of the earth's surface . . . [and] this agreement
...has led to a broad scientific consensus that the projections of a warmer
climate should be taken seriously. . . . [There is, however,] some controversy
over whether or not we have already observed the beginning of the greenhouse
warming. The controversy is less than it might seem; it mostly has to do with the
standards of proof. If you were to ask what the preponderance of the evidence
shows, most experts would say yes the heating has begun. If you require the
stiffer standard of beyond reasonable doubt, most would say let's wait a few
years and see.
Id.
6. See Morgenstern & Tirpak, Projecting the Impacts of Greenhouse Warming, 15
EPA J. 8 (Jan.-Feb. 1987) (describing the EPA's use of global circulation models
(GCMs) to help determine the impact of climate change).
7. See REALISING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, GREENPEACE KEY PAPER 2
(July 1989) (explaining that the "Precautionary Principle" reverses the current regula-
tory approach used with most pollutants, which assumes that the biosphere can assimi-
late pollution until monitoring proves otherwise, and that the "Precautionary Principle"
shifts the burden to the polluter to show the absence of harm); see also TVA v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 178 (1974) (noting that the Endangered Species Act institutionalizes
caution with regard to the preservation of the nation's genetic heritage).
8. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON
FUTURE 43 (1987) (describing sustainable development as development that meets pre-
sent needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs). This conception of sustainable development contemplates the needs of the
world's poor and the limitations technology and social organizations place on the envi-
ronment's ability to meet present and future needs. Id.
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states, for example, society will have to eliminate its wasteful lifestyles
to reduce greenhouse gases and shift to sustainable development. In the
less developed states,9 society will have to avoid adopting wasteful life-
styles, and, with the assistance of the developed world, avoid using inef-
ficient technologies in favor of promoting a sustainable society. 10
The purpose of this article is to consider what mechanisms are avail-
able to developing states to better enable them to achieve a global pre-
cautionary agreement on global warming. This article focuses on low-
9. The terms "developing states" and "less developed states" are used in this article
interchangeably and refer to states still developing their economic/industrial sector.
See Report of the First Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Lawyer, done at Helsinki, May 6, 1989, U.N. Doc. UNEP/
02L.Pro.1/5 at 18-19 (1989) (listing the developing states to the Protocol). They in-
clude Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Baha-
mas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote
d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of),
Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Laos People's Democratic
Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, St. Chris-
topher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands,
Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand,
Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United
Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia,
Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Id.
10. See TORONTO CONFERENCE STATEMENT, supra note 1, para. 13 (addressing the
responsibility of developed states vis-a-vis developing states).
[T]he countries of the industrially developed world are the main source of
greenhouse gases and therefore bear the main responsibility to the world commu-
nity for ensuring that measures are implemented to address the issues posed by
climate change. At the same time, they must see that the developing nations of
the world, whose problems are greatly aggravated by population growth, are as-
sisted and not inhibited in improving their economies and the living conditions of
their citizens. This will necessitate a wide range of measures, including signifi-
cant additional energy use in those countries and compensating reductions in in-
dustrialized countries. The transition to a sustainable future will require invest-
ments in energy efficiency and non-fossil energy sources. In order to ensure that
these investments occur, the global community must not only halt the current net
transfer of resources from developing countries, but actually reverse it. This re-
versal should embrace the relevant technologies involved, taking into account the
implications for industry.
Id.; see also CLIMATE INSTITUTE, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON THE IM-
PACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR THE THIRD WORLD: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING 23-24 (Mar. 24-25, 1988) (available at the Climate
Institute, Washington, D.C.) (explaining that "the Third World can be expected to




lying island and coastal states which will be most affected by the sea-
level rise caused by global warming. Part I describes global warming
and its impacts, with an emphasis on sea-level rise. Part II suggests
how low-lying states can use the international legal process to protect
their unique interests. Both the judicial and the law-making process are
discussed. Part III discusses participation by developing states in the
international legal response to global warming. It also discusses the role
of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in assisting states that ad-
dress global warming and other environmental threats and argues for a
broader role for NGOs in the international process. The article ad-
dresses whether an incremental approach using existing international
law and institutions will be sufficient to meet the challenge of global
warming or whether the problem is so different from any other, that a
completely new approach, including new legal principles and institu-
tions, will be necessary.
I. GLOBAL WARMING AND SEA-LEVEL RISE
Among the developing states, the low-lying coastal and island states
have special reason to be concerned about global warming and to use
the international legal process to protect their interests. As a conse-
quence of global warming, some will lose significant territory while
others could literally disappear under the rising sea-level."
A. THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT
The term "greenhouse effect" refers to the ability of the atmosphere
to absorb heat and warm the earth. The sun emits energy primarily as
visible (short) wavelength radiation, which passes relatively easily
through the atmosphere. 2 In contrast, the much cooler earth emits
longer wavelength infrared radiation which is absorbed by greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere.13 This "trapped" energy warms the atmo-
sphere and reradiates heat back to earth, in a manner roughly analo-
gous to the process for warming a botanical greenhouse.
Some greenhouse gases, including water vapor and carbon dioxide
(CO2), occur naturally in the atmosphere; the absence of such gases
11. MAL DECLARATION ON GLOBAL WARMING AND SEA LEVEL RISE, held in
MaI6, Maldives on Nov. 14-18, 1989 [hereinafter MALt DECLARATION], reprinted in
SELECTED LEGAL MATERIALS, 5 Am. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 602 (1990).
12. See MacDonald, Scientific Basis for the Greenhouse Effect, in THE CHAL-
LENGE OF GLOBAL WARMING 123, 126 (D. Abrahamson ed. 1989) (explaining that
radiation is emitted from the sun primarily in the region from 0.4 to 1.0 microns).
13. Id. at 126. Radiation from the earth is mainly in the range from 6 to 22 mi-
crons. Id. at 127, fig. 9.1.
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would make the earth about 35 degrees centigrade colder and, thereby,
incapable of supporting life. 4 Since the beginning of the industrial age,
however, the burning of fossil fuel and other human activities have sub-
stantially increased the concentrations of CO2 and other naturally oc-
curring greenhouse gases.' 5 Man has also released artificial, extremely
potent, and long-lived greenhouse gases, such as chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) and other halocarbons, into the atmosphere.'
6
14. Id. at 124.
15. Cicerone, Global Warming, Acid Rain, and Ozone Depletion, in THE CHAL-
LENGE OF GLOBAL WARMING 231, 232, fig. 15.1 (D. Abrahamson ed. 1989) (giving the
pre-industrial and 1986 atmospheric concentrations of CO 2, methane (CH4), nitrous
oxide (N0), and tropospheric ozone (0,)); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, POLICY OPTIONS FOR STABILIZING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE , EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 12, 15-16 (Feb. 1989) (draft report to Congress) [hereinafter POLICY OP-
TIONS] (describing the primary sources and rates of greenhouse gas emissions).
The concentration of CO. in the atmosphere has increased by approximately 25%,
from a pre-industrial level of 275 ppm to a level of 346 ppm in 1986. Cicerone, supra
at 232, fig. 15.1. The present rate of increase is approximately 0.4% per year. Id.
Fossil-fuel combustion is the primary source of CO. and accounts for the emission of
approximately 5.5 billion tons of carbon, while deforestation, in particularly tropical
rainforest destruction, accounts for the emission of 0.4 to 2.6 billion tons of carbon.
POLICY OPTIONS, supra, at 15. CO. accounts for 49% of the contribution to global
warming from greenhouse gases. Id. at 12, fig. 3.
Methane, the second most important greenhouse gas, contributes 18 % to greenhouse
warming. Id. The atmospheric concentration of methane has increased by 120% from
a preindustrial level of .75 ppm to a level of 1.65 ppm in 1986. Cicerone, supra, at 232,
fig. 15.1. The sources of methane are not known with certainty. Increased rice cultiva-
tion and animal husbandry, landfills, and coal seams probably cause this increase in
methane emission. POLICY OPTIONS, supra, at 15.
Nitrous oxide has increased from pre-industrial levels of 280 ppm to 305 ppm in
1986. Cicerone, supra, at 232, fig. 15.1. Nitrous oxide contributes 6% to greenhouse
induced warming. POLICY OPTIONS, supra, at 12, fig. 3. The sources of nitrous oxide
are also uncertain. They are thought to include nitrogenous fertilizer, land clearing,
biomass burning, and fossil fuel combustion, Id. at 15.
The remaining "natural" greenhouse gases, for example CO, NOx, and tropospheric
ozone account altogether for 13 % of the greenhouse gas contribution to global warm-
ing. Id. at 12, fig. 3.
16. See POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 15, at 16 (stating that CFCs were introduced
into the atmosphere for the first time in the twentieth century). Although CFCs are
present in the atmosphere in much smaller concentrations than C02, molecule for mol-
ecule, a CFC may be 20,000 times more potent a greenhouse gas than CO2. Id. Unlike
CO2, CFCs have no natural sinks, so once released into the atmosphere they remain
until they break down, a period of 50 to 200 years. Ciborowski, Sources, Sinks,
Trends, and Opportunities, in THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL WARMING 213, 220 (D.
Abrahamson ed. 1989). CFCs account for 18% of the total contribution of greenhouse
gases to global warming. Id. at 12, fig. 3; Montreal Protocol on Substances That De-
plete the Ozone Layer, adopted and opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1989), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987) [hereinafter Montreal Proto-
col]. CFCs have recently become subject to international regulation because of their
potential for depleting stratospheric ozone, a problem closely related to climate change.
Id. Production of CFCs is scheduled by international agreement to be reduced by as
much as 50% by 1999. Id.; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
adopted and opened for signature Mar. 22, 1985 (entered into force Sept. 22, 1988),
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By the year 2030, at present rates, the increase in greenhouse gases
will be approximately equivalent to a doubling of the amount of CO2 in
the atmosphere prior to the industrial revolution.1" The effects of such
a substantial increase in greenhouse gases will be dramatic, and per-
haps catastrophic. Global mean temperatures are expected to increase
between 1.5 to 4.5 degrees centigrade within the next 40 years. 8 This
rapid and unprecedented increase in global temperatures is expected to
have a number of severe impacts, including inter-regional shifts in agri-
culture and diminished agricultural productivity, reduced availability of
freshwater, and forest dieback resulting in reduced fuelwood supplies.
In addition, global warming is expected to cause sea levels to rise,
thereby increasing coastal flooding, erosion of shorelines, inundation of
wetlands and lowlands, salinization of estuaries and aquifers, and in-
frastructural damage from storm surges."
Climate predictions are made on the basis of complex, three-dimen-
sional computer models, representing the atmosphere and surface of the
earth. 0 Despite the use of the most powerful supercomputers, however,
these global circulation models (GCMs) are limited in their ability to
represent and predict global climate.2 1 Complex climate-related sys-
tems, such as ocean currents, clouds, and many climate "feedback"
processes can presently be represented only crudely, if at all.22 As a
reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1529 (1987) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Oceans and En-
vironment Program, Office of Technology Assessment, An Analysis of the Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, in THE CHALLENGE OF
GLOBAL WARMING 291, 293-94 (D. Abrahamson ed. 1989) (suggesting that the Mon-
treal Protocol is unlikely to meet the 1999 target, and may in fact permit CFC produc-
tion to increase).
17. International Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and Other Greenhouse
Gases in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts, held in Villach, Austria on Oct.
9-15, 1985, reprinted in The Scientific Consensus, in THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL
WARMING 63, 64 (D. Abrahamson ed. 1989).
18. Id. at 65. These numbers take on added meaning when one considers that at
the height of the last ice age, some 18,000 years ago, the earth was only 3 to 5 degrees
Centigrade than it is today. S. SCHNEIDER, GLOBAL WARMING 28 (1989).
19. See infra notes 24-48 and accompanying text (discussing the causes and effects
of sea-level rise).
20. Firor, Greenhouse Effects and Impacts on Physical Systems, in THE CHAL-
LENGE OF GLOBAL WARMING 113, 114 (D. Abrahamson ed. 1989); see U.S. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF CIMATE CHANGE ON THE
UNITED STATES 22 (Dec. 1989) (report to Congress) [hereinafter POTENTIAL EFFECTS].
Climate modeling research utilizing global circulation models is currently being carried
out at the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), Oregon State Univer-
sity (OSU), NOAA's Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL), NASA's God-
dard Institute for Space Studies (GISS), and the United Kingdom Meteorological Of-
fice (UKMO). Id. at 24.
21. POTENTIAL EFFECTS, supra note 20, at 22.
22. Id.; Lashof, The Dynamic Greenhouse. Feedback Processes That Can Influence
Global Warming, in COPING WITH CLIMATE CHANGE 102, 102 (Topping ed. 1989).
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consequence, GCMs are able to predict climate change only within
rather broad ranges.
23
23. Uncertainties about these climate related systems have caused some researchers
to question the" reliability of GCMs and the inferences which may be drawn from them.
Some feedback processes, for example, are known to enhance the greenhouse effect,
others are known to retard it, while for still others, it cannot be said with certainty
whether they will increase or decrease the greenhouse effect.
The many potential feedback processes associated with global warming, taken to-
gether, could significantly alter the rate and extent of climate change. Lashof, supra
note 22, at 102. Feedback processes, however, are not very well understood and, conse-
quently, most have not been included in climate models. Id. One example of a positive
feedback process is the decrease in albedo (reflectivity) caused by melting snow and ice
cover. This contributes to warming as the earth absorbs more energy from the sun. Id.
at 103. Forest dieback caused by global warming would trigger another positive feed-
back process, as decomposing biota on the ground and in the soil releases CO2 and
methane, increasing the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases, and contribut-
ing to warming. Id. at 105.
Not all feedback mechanisms are positive. For example, increased amounts of CO.
in the atmosphere could stimulate plant growth, thereby removing carbon from the
atmosphere and storing it safely in plants. Id. The ability of forests to store large
amounts of carbon suggests that afforestation and reforestation can play important
roles in solving the problem of global warming. It is estimated in one study that a net
annual addition of 3.5 billion hectares of new forest could sequester the entire annual
emission of CO2. Sedjo & Solomon, Climate and Forests, in GREENHOUSE WARMING:
ABATEMENT AND ADAPTATION 105, 109 (Rosenberg, Easterling, Crosson, & Darm-
stadter eds. 1989).
Warmer atmospheric temperatures are likely to give rise to increased cloud forma-
tion. Lashof, supra note 22, at 102. Generally, an increase in low cloud cover will
produce a negative feedback, while an increase in high cirrus clouds will produce a
positive feedback. Id. However, GCMs cannot determine which type of clouds are
likely to form, and hence, whether cloud formation will enhance or diminish the green-
house effect. Id. at 103.
Another source of climate uncertainty is the system of oceans. Oceans are huge ther-
mal reservoirs. Because oceans warm less rapidly than the atmosphere, there is a time-
lag during which ocean and atmospheric temperatures are not in equilibrium. MacDon-
ald, supra note 12, at 124. Thus, temperature records do not accurately reflect the
global commitment to warming. Even if atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases were
stabilized, the global temperature would rise perhaps an additional 0.5-0.7 degrees
Centigrade. Abrahamson, Global Warming: The Issue, Impacts, Responses, in THE
CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL WARMING 3, 10 (D. Abrahamson ed. 1989).
Oceans also store tremendous amounts of carbon, equivalent to more than 80% of
the earth's total carbon reserves. Woodwell, Biotic Causes and Effects of the Disrup-
tion of the Global Carbon Cycle, in THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL WARMING 71, 75 (D.
Abrahamson ed. 1989). Recent studies indicate, however, that researchers may have
overestimated the ability of oceans to absorb anthropogenically emitted CO. from the
atmosphere. Oceans, 3 World Climate Change Rep. (BNA) 13 (Dec. 1989). Oceans
may take up only 30% of anthropogenically produced CO2 rather than 50% as previ-
ously estimated. Id. If this finding is correct, it means that greenhouse events could
occur about 20% sooner than previously expected. Id.
Although the precise interaction between climate and oceans is not well understood,
the impact of oceans on climate is evident when one considers, for example, that Eu-
rope, which is at the latitude of Siberia and Hudson Bay, has a much milder climate
due to the effects of the Gulf Stream. S. SCHNEIDER, supra note 18, at 47. It is clear
that ocean currents play an important and complex role in determining the earth's




Global warming from the greenhouse effect will cause sea level to
rise, as gradually warming oceans undergo thermal expansion, and
small mountain glaciers melt."' Sea-level will rise 25 to 40 centimeters
by 2050,5 and perhaps as much as 2 meters by 2100,26 according to
current estimates.
The impacts of rising sea level include: (1) inundation of wetlands
and lowlands;27 (2) erosion of shorelines;28 (3) increased coastal flood-
if the deep, salty currents which circumnavigate the globe are disrupted. Such a disrup-
tion could occur if changes in climate alter the precipitation patterns carrying fresh-
water from the Atlantic to the Pacific, changing the distribution of salt which helps
drive these currents. Broecker, What Drives Glacial Cycles?, Sci. AM., Jan. 1990, at
49.
24. See POTENTIAL EFFECTS, supra note 20, at 123-25; INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKSHOP REPORT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGE-
MENT SUBGROUP OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE: ADAP-
TIVE OPTIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SEA LEVEL RISE AND OTHER COASTAL
IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 2, held in Washington, D.C. on Nov. 27-Dec. 1
1989) [hereinafter WORKSHOP REPORT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT
SUBGROUP].
The level of the sea is primarily determined by climate. During the last major ice
age (18,000 years ago) a substantial amount of the water in today's oceans was locked
in glaciers, and the surface of the sea was 100 meters below its present level. POTEN-
TIAL EFFECTS, supra note 20, at 124. Conversely, during the last interglacial period
(100,000 years ago), when the mean temperature was about one degree centigrade
warmer than today, the surface of the sea was approximately seven meters above its
present level. Id.
Numerous studies have examined the possibility of a significant contribution to sea-
level rise from melting and eventual disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet.
See Titus, The Causes and Effects of Sea Level Rise, in THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL
WARMING 161, 164 (D. Abrahamson ed. 1989). Most experts, however, do not regard
this as likely to happen within the next century. Id. Nevertheless, the possibility cannot
be entirely dismissed. In such a case estimates of global sea-level rise range as high as
6 m. Hekstra, Sea-Level Rise: Regional Consequences and Responses, in GREENHOUSE
WARMING: ABATEMENT AND ADAPTATION 53, 55 (Rosenberg, Easterling, Crosson, &
Darmstadter eds. 1989). While melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet is expected to con-
tribute 0.37 mm per year to sea-level rise, the increase will probably be offset by a 0.3
mm per year decrease due to ice accumulation in Antarctica. WORKSHOP REPORT TO
THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP, supra, at 2.
25. WORKSHOP REPORT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP, supra
note 24, at 2.
26. POTENTIAL EFFECTS, supra note 20, at 123.
27. WORKSHOP REPORT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP, supra
note 24, at 2; Titus, An Overview of the Effects of Sea Level Rise, (unpublished paper
prepared for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1989) [hereinafter Titus, An
Overview].
The land area that would be subject to inundation or deterioration from saltwater
intrusion within one to three centuries is on the order of five million square kilome-
ters--only about 3 % of total land area, but one-third of the world's cropland. Hekstra,
supra note 24, at 60. Much of this area is densely populated and contains many large
cities. Id.
Wetlands have historically responded to sea-level rise by migrating landward. Po-
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ing;29 (4) salinization of estuaries and aquifers;30 (5) altered tidal
ranges in rivers and bays;31 (6) delta subsidence due to changes in sedi-
ment deposition; 2 (7) increased height and frequency of waves;33 and
(8) decreased light reaching the ocean floor.34
TENTIAL EFFECTS, supra note 20, at 125. But the rapid rise of sea levels forced by
global warming threatens to overtake the ability of wetlands to migrate. Leatherman,
Impacts of Sea Level Rise on the Coasts of South America 75 (Univ. of Md. 1989)
(unpublished). Manmade structures such as roads, buildings and bulkheads will impede
the movement of wetlands. Titus, supra note 24, at 171. Wetland migration will be
further impeded by dikes and levees which may be necessary to protect valuable coastal
areas from sea-level rise. Id. at 173-74. The USEPA estimates that if only densely
developed areas of the United States coast are protected, a 50 centimeter sea-level rise
would cause the loss of 20-45% of coastal wetlands. POTENTIAL EFFECTS, supra note
20, at 140, table 7-4. A 200 centimeter rise would result in the loss of 33-80%. Id. If
all shores are protected, up to 90% of coastal wetlands could be lost. Id.
28. WORKSHOP REPORT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP, supra
note 24, at 2; Titus, An Overview, supra note 27. Erosion of shorelines results in the
loss of substantially more land than that which is directly inundated by sea-level rise.
Titus, An Overview, supra note 27. A one-meter rise would generally cause sandy
beaches to erode 50-200 meters. Id. Atoll islands, subject to constant erosion from
slowly rising seas, maintain themselves with fresh sand produced by coral reefs, which
are themselves threatened by sea-level rise. WORKSHOP REPORT TO THE COASTAL
ZONE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP, supra note 24, at 3. Beaches and beach resorts are
particularly threatened by erosion due to sea-level rise. Titus, supra note 24, at 178.
Most resort beaches are not more than 30 meters wide at high tide and would be
subject to erosion from a rise of 30-40 centimeter. Id.
29. WORKSHOP REPORT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP, supra
note 24, at 2; Titus, An Overview, supra note 27. Sea-level rise could increase the risk
of flooding in a number of ways, including: (1) raising the "base" of storm surges; (2)
removing protective barriers such as sand dunes, beaches, mangrove swamps, and mar-
shes; and (3) decreasing drainage after storms. Id.
30. WORKSHOP REPORT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP, supra
note 24, at 2; Titus, An Overview, supra note 27. Sea-level rise increases the salinity of
estuaries by widening and deepening them, thereby increasing the amount of sea water
which mixes with freshwater and resisting freshwater inflow. Id. Saltwater penetration
can reduce aquifers, particularly in very low-lying areas where the land above sea level
is so shallow that the freshwater lens is "squeezed" out. Id.
31. WORKSHOP REPORT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP, supra
note 24, at 2; Titus, An Overview, supra note 27. Sea-level rise could change tidal
ranges by removing barriers to tidal currents and changing the resonance frequencies
of tidal basins. Id.
32. WORKSHOP REPORT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP, supra
note 24, at 2; Titus, An Overview, supra note 27. Sea-level rise would shift the area of
sediment deposition upstream, thereby changing the location and configuration of del-
tas. Id.
33. WORKSHOP REPORT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP, supra
note 24, at 2; Titus, An Overview, supra note 27. In shallow areas, the depth of the
water limits the size of waves. As sea-level rise deepens these areas, the size of waves
will increase. Id.
34. WORKSHOP REPORT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP, supra
note 24, at 2; Titus, An Overview, supra note 27. As sea level rises, less light will reach




Developed areas will be particularly affected by sea-level rise. While
shorelines constitute only a small fraction of the land area of most na-
tions, a disproportionately large amount of development is located near
coasts.35 These threatened areas contain many major cities and up to
one-fifth of the world's population.3" A one-meter rise in sea-level
would destroy a large portion of Bangladesh.' A two-meter rise would
inundate its capital, Dhaka, as well as Shanghai and Lagos-the larg-
est cities of China and Nigeria-and 20% of the populated area and
farmland of Egypt.38
Of all geographic areas, low-lying reef and atoll islands, such as
those found in the South Pacific and Indian Oceans, may be the most
threatened by sea-level rise.39 These islands are rarely more than three
meters above sea level and some are considerably less. 0 Within only a
few decades the islands of Kiribati could disappear beneath the Pacific,
making refugees of the islands' 60,000 inhabitants." The Republic of
Maldives, in the Indian Ocean, is also vulnerable; a two-meter rise in
sea level would flood the capital and over one-half the populated atoll
islands of the republic. 2 The Pacific atoll island nations of Tokelau,
35. WORKSHOP REPORT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP, supra
note 24, at 1-2 (describing the commercial, recreational, and environmental values of
coastal areas); see also Titus, An Overview, supra note 27 (describing the attraction of
coastal areas for purposes of development and human habitation).
36. Hekstra, supra note 24, at 60. Sir Crispin Tickell, Permanent Representative to
the UN for the UK, estimates that within 50 or 60 years, as many as 300 million
people could be made environmental refugees by sea-level rise. Tickell, Environmental
Refugees: The Human Impact of Global Climate Change, Natural Environment Re-
search Council Annual Lecture given at the Royal Society, London, June 5, 1989.
37. WORKSHOP REPORT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP, supra
note 24, at 3. A one-meter, sea-level rise will flood 12% of habitable deltaic Ban-
gladesh in an area where 9% of the population resides. Summary Report of the Sym-
posium on the Impact of Climate Change for the Third World: Implications for Eco-
nomic Development and Financing 9-10 (Mar. 24-25, 1988), held in Washington, D.C.
(summarizing speech of Dr. James Broadus, Dir. Marine Policy Center, Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institute) [hereinafter Broadus Speech]. The resulting economic loss is
estimated at $ 1 billion, representing 8 % of GDP. Id. Other authors estimate signifi-
cantly greater land loss due to a one meter sea-level rise.
38. WORKSHOP REPORT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP, supra
note 24, at 3.
39. See MALt DECLARATION, supra note 11 (describing the special predicament of
small, coastal and island states); see also TATA CONFERENCE STATEMENT, supra note 2
(asserting that many of the most serious effects of global climate change will occur in
the developing countries).
40. Roy & Connell, The Greenhouse Effect: Where Have All the Islands Gone?,
PAC. ISLANDS MONTHLY, Apr.- May, 1989, at 16-17.
41. Id. at 17. Kiribati has 20 populated atolls and a land area of 700 square kilo-
meters, more than half on the island of Kiritimati. Id. President leremia Tabai of
Kiribati remarked that "[i]f the greenhouse effect raises sea levels by one meter it will
virtually do away with Kiribati." Id.
42. Titus, An Overview, supra note 27; The Maldives consist of a double chain of
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Tuvalu, and the Marshall Islands are similarly threatened.43
Even a moderate rise in sea level could have serious consequences for
small coastal and island states. Despite their small size, many have rel-
atively large populations."" Existing problems caused by rapid popula-
tion growth and development would be exacerbated as floods, and pos-
sibly tropical storms, become more frequent and severe.45 Erosion,
already a problem, due in part to the diversion of currents by man-
made structures, would be accelerated." Saltwater would displace
freshwater, diminishing already strained supplies of drinking water and
damaging crops which cannot tolerate salt.47 Tourism and fishing, eco-
nomic staples for small coastal and island states, will also suffer as
beaches erode and dying coral reefs cease to yield their plentiful supply
of bait.48
26 atolls. Wells & Edwards, Gone With the Waves, NEw Sci., Nov. 11, 1989, at 48.
Most of its islands lie between 1 and 1.5 meters above mean sea level and its highest
point is 3.5 m. Id. Most of the population live between 0.8 and two meters above mean
sea level. Id.; Letter dated 20 November 1989 from the Permanent Representative of
Maldives to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/
C.2/44/8 (Nov. 24, 1989). In his inaugural address, His Excellency Maumoon Abdul
Gayoom, President of the Republic of Maldives stated:
[n]or would any of our fisherman ever think that the sea which is the bountiful
source of his livelihood could, in a matter of decades, become his eternal grave.
But that, Ladies and Gentlemen, is precisely the prospect that we have to face
today. . . . As we are all aware, there is a growing scientific consensus that
within the next century, sea levels will rise at a faster rate than at any time in
history. . . . [W]e in the Maldives are convinced that a universal campaign
against the causes of climate change and global warming should be undertaken
at once. But the Maldives is not going to be the only victim. Many other coun-
tries represented here will have to bear the brunt of the ocean's onslaught a few
decades from now. And the stark truth is that no realistic solutions . . . have
yet been identified.
Id. at 1-4.
43. Roy & Connell, supra note 40.
44. Id. at 20 (declaring that the Marshall Islands has one of the fastest-growing
populations in the world, with Kiribati and Tuvalu not far behind); Wells & Edwards,
supra note 42, at 48 (declaring that in the Maldives the population of more than
200,000 is growing at the rate of 3.1 % per year).
45. Wells & Edwards, supra note 42, at 48 (discussing the impact of increasing
storm intensity on the Maldives and Pacific coral nations).
46. Id.; WORKSHOP REPORT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT SUBGROUP,
supra note 24, at 3 (discussing the increased erosion of atoll islands which would result
from a reduction in coral productivity due to sea-level rise); Roy & Connell, supra note
40, at 20 (discussing the effects of erosion on atoll islands and the difficulty of protect-
ing islands against erosion).
47. Roy & Connell, supra note 40, at 20. In the Republic of Maldives, the fresh-
water supplies of the capital, Mal6 are dwindling. Consumption greatly exceeds
recharge into the aquifer, so that freshwater is presently available only in the center of
the island. Titus, An Overview, supra note 27.
48. Wells & Edwards, supra note 42, at 50-51.
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II. USING THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS TO
PROTECT LOW-LYING DEVELOPING STATES
To protect their territory and population from sea-level rise and to
ensure their full and equitable participation in the global warming de-
bate, low-lying developing states have at least two separate, but related,
opportunities to use the international legal process. The first is to use
the judicial process by way of a contentious action in the ICJ, an action
submitted by special agreement, or through a request for an advisory
opinion. 9 The goal would be an opinion from the Court on the gov-
erning principles in international law affecting the states responsible
for, and victims of, sea-level rise and other consequences of global
warming.
The second option is to draft an international convention on global
warming as an alternative model to use in the negotiations with the
international community. In particular, such a convention would focus
on the special concerns of low-lying states and help elaborate the legal
regime which is expected to be declared in 1992 at the twenty-year
review of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Global
Environment.5
A. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
As discussed above, the less industrialized low-lying coastal states,
especially islands such as Kiribati in the South Pacific and the
Maldives in the Indian Ocean and river deltas such as Bangladesh, are
expected to be among the first and most severely affected by global
warming. 1 Sea-level rise, combined with the increased intensity and
49. U.N. CHARTER art. 96. The International Court of Justice will hear a case and
issue an advisory opinion on the request of an applicant party. Id. However, the appli-
cant must be (1) a body or organization authorized by the UN to make such requests,
and (2) the matter on which an advisory opinion is requested must be a "legal question
arising out of the scope of their activities." Id. The bodies expressly authorized to make
such requests include the General Assembly, Security Council, or any authorized organ
of the UN or specialized agency. Id. The General assemble has authorized the follow-
ing bodies in accordance with art. 96(2) of the Charter: the Economic and Social
Council, the Trusteeship Council, the interim Committee of the General Assembly, the
Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments, the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency, and all the specialized agencies except the Univer-
sal Postal Union. Id. The UN General Assembly retains the power to authorize bodies
to request an advisory opinion; it may do so continually and is not restricted to any
particular number of bodies. Id.
50. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, G.A. Res.
228, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 300, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), reprinted in
SELECTED LEGAL MATERIALS, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 621 (1990). The confer-
ence will be hosted by the Government of Brazil. Id. subpara. 2.
51. See supra notes 25-48 and accompanying text (discussing sea-level rise and
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frequency of storms, could cause the loss of lives, property, livelihood,
and, in some cases, the entire territory of a state, creating stateless
environmental refugees.
As discussed next, these states, particularly the relatively blameless
victim states which do not produce any appreciable greenhouse gases,
may be able to use the ICJ to obtain international legal remedies. The
notions of liability, responsibility, illegality, and duty to compensate
may support certain legal actions by a low-lying state or group of such
states against one or more industrialized states, or justify an applica-
tion to the ICJ for an advisory opinion.5" Developing the applicable
international legal principles through litigation will also assist states to
develop their own policy positions for participation in the convention
process.5"
1. Existing Legal Principles
The substantive legal principles a state would rely upon in the ICJ
are the same regardless of the procedural route chosen. A state would
need to characterize the creation of circumstances leading to the identi-
fication of global warming and sea-level rise as an international legal
wrong justifying a remedy.
Under general principles of international law it may be possible to
demonstrate that there exists an obligation not to allow the territory of
one state to be used to generate conditions leading the catastrophic
consequences of global warming and sea-level rise. It may not be neces-
sary to show that the developed states had knowledge that their activi-
ties were damaging and contributed to the phenomenon of global
warming. It must be shown that, rather, as a matter of fact, developed
states are completely responsible for the use of substances or industrial
operations which contribute to global warming and cause damage.
54
Traditionally, proving the existence of a rule of customary interna-
tional law upon which to base a claim for damage to the environment
associated impacts of global warming); see also Sancton, What on Earth Are We Do-
ing?, TIME, Jan. 2, 1989, at 27 (referring to the flooding in Bangladesh).
52. But see Sand, Institutions for Global Change: Whither Environmental Govern-
ance?, 5th Tallories Seminar on International Environmental Issues, (May 14-18,
1989) (discussing the general opposition to the use of the ICJ).
53. Litigation also may help augment the political power of the otherwise less pow-
erful developing states and provide them greater opportunity to protect their unique
interests. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw-A TREATISE 19, 20 (1905).
54. See The "Act of State" According to International Law [1973] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 161, 188, U.N. Doe. A/9010/Rev. 1 (1973) (discussing requirements for
holding states internationally responsible for acts or omissions).
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has been troublesome.55 The nature and scope of the rules are not par-
ticularly clear. Customary international law does not, for example, set-
tle the question of the attribution to the state damage caused by private
activities within its territory. 6 Moreover, the present system of state
liability is inadequate, in many respects, for dealing with the conse-
quences of transboundary pollution and other environmentally damag-
ing activities having international consequences.
International law assumes that all states have the sovereign right to
develop their economy and to prescribe rules to govern activities which
take place on sovereign territory.5 7 In the Corfu Channel Case (UK v.
Albania),58 however, the ICJ endorsed the principle that sovereignty
itself embodies "the obligation of every state not to allow its territory to
be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states." Similarly, in the
Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. France),5 9 the Tribunal held that a
state has an obligation not to use its rights to the extent of ignoring the
rights of others.
In the only known international action involving air pollution, the
Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada),60 the United States
55. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 4-15 (discussing the establishment of cus-
tomary rules of international law).
56. See The "Act of State" According to International Law, supra note 54, at 189
(explaining the rules of liability of states for acts of its nationals).
57. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (A/
9631) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (Jan. 15,
1975) (providing in Chapter 2, Article 1 that "every state has the sovereign and ina-
lienable right to choose its economic system as well as its political, social and cultural
systems in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion
or threat in any form whatsoever").
58. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22. As four British warships
passed within Albanian territorial waters on their way through the North Corfu Chan-
nel, two of them were badly damaged after striking mines. Three weeks later the Brit-
ish swept the channel and cleared it of some twenty mines. Id. at 12-13. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice held that "states in time of peace have a right to send their
warships through straits used for navigation between two parts of the high seas without
the previous authorization of a coastal state provided that the passage is innocent." Id.
at 28 (emphasis in original). Although the minesweeping operation was not "innocent"
and violated Albania's sovereignty, the earlier passages by the British ships were legal.
Id. at 29-30. Due to Albania's knowledge of the presence of the mines, the Court held
Albania responsible for the deadly consequences of their presence. Id. at 37-39.
59. Lake Lanoux (Fr. v. Spain), 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156 (1959). In order to gener-
ate hydroelectric power France proposed to divert water from the Carol River which
ran from France into Spain. Id. Spain objected by stating that such a project violated
treaties between the two countries and customary law. Id. The tribunal seemed to ac-
cept the principle that an upstream state acts unlawfully if it changes the condition of a
river to the serious injury of a down stream state, however, the tribunal ultimately held
that France's efforts to make full restitution to the river were sufficient not to contra-
vene any rule of international law. Id. at 170.
60. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int.l Arb. Awards 1907 (1941).
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brought a claim against Canada for damage to property in the state of
Washington caused by sulfuric and other noxious fumes drifting over
the frontier from a smelter in British Columbia. The Tribunal declared
that:
[U]nder the principles of international law . . . no state has the right to use or
permit the use of territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to
the territory of another, of the properties of persons therein, when the case is of
serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence."'
The principles of Trail Smelter Case are accepted as a rule of cus-
tomary international law by a large number of states. In the Nuclear
Tests Case (Australia v. France), Australia asked the ICJ to declare
that the carrying out of further atmospheric nuclear tests was inconsis-
tent with the applicable rules of international law and would be unlaw-
ful "in so far as it involves modification of the physical conditions of
and over Australian territory [and] pollution of the atmosphere and of
the resources of the seas." 2 The Trail Smelter principles were cited
with approval and may well have determined the outcome of the case
had the French Government not made a unilateral declaration of intent
to stop testing.63 As a result of this declaration, the Court stopped short
of issuing a decision on the merits of the action.
In 1972, the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, held in
Stockholm, led to a Declaration of Principles (the Stockholm Declara-
tion) to preserve and enhance the human environment. 4 This Declara-
tion broadly reflects the Trail Smelter principles. Principle 21, for ex-
ample, provides that:
[S]tates have ... the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdic-
tion or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 6'
Although the Stockholm Declaration is not legally binding, it has
received considerable support from states and has guided state practice.
For example, Principle 21 was expressly recommended by a U.N. Gen-
61. Id. at 1965.
62. Nuclear Tests (Aus. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253.
63. Id. at 389 (Judge de Castro, dissenting).
64. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, in Report of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 and
Corr. 1 (1972), U.N. Sales No. E. 73. II. A.14 and Corr., reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416
(1972). Delegates from 113 States attended the Conference and adopted a Declaration
of Principles for the Preservation and Enhancement of the Human Environment and an
Action Plan consisting of 109 Recommendations for environmental action at the inter-
national level. Id.
65. Id. at 1420.
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eral Assembly Resolution 6 as laying down the basic rules governing
the international responsibility of states in regard to the environment.
The principle is echoed in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3281,67
in Article 30 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
and in Article 194(2) of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, which provides:
[S]tates shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to
other states and their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or
activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas
where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention.o
It may be possible to establish that the Trail Smelter case and Prin-
ciple 21 together have become customary international law through
state practice and the requisite opinion juris (the belief by a state that
its acts and practice are required as a matter of law).7 If such a rule
can be proved to have emerged, then any breach of that rule would
lead to the obligation or liability to make reparation. This is an undis-
puted rule of international law. It is reflected in, for example, the
Chorzow Factory Case,71 and is now codified in Article 1 of the Inter-
national Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
72
In addition to the foundation provided by traditional international
legal principles for a global warming action, further support may be
found in recent developments in international environmental law. In
particular, new legal theories are emerging which bond traditional and
modern elements. All courts like to be persuaded that there is a contin-
uous thread of principle which justifies or explains changes in the law
when in fact change may be in the form of an evolutionary leap. It is in
this area that low-lying states could be most hopeful of advocating the
movement forward of the law so that it adequately addresses and set-
66. International Responsibility of States in Regard to the Environment, G.A.
Res. 2996, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. at 42-43, U.N. Doc. A/8901 (1972).
67. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, supra note 57.
68. Id.
69. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1308
(1982) [hereinafter Convention on Law of the Sea].
70. See P. Sands, Transboundary Nuclear Air Pollution-The Legal Materials, in
CHERNOBYL: LAW AND COMMUNICATION 1, 11 n.49 (P. Sands ed. 1988) (stating that
"[m]ost writers have accepted this formulation [in the Trail Smelter case] as a rule of
customary international law"); id. at 15 (stating that "the Trail Smelter case . . .
[and] Principle 21 . . . together suggest that a universally accepted rule has emerged,
and is applicable to transboundary nuclear pollution").
71. Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47.
72. The "Act of State" According to International Law. supra note 54, at 173.
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tles the issues arising from global warming and sea-level rise.
2. Recent Developments in International Environmental Law
While no treaty presently addresses directly the global warming
threat, substantive legal principles do exist in dozens of treaties be-
tween many states. These principles may be relied upon as expressions
of custom in order to flesh out the body of customary rules and should
also be considered in any new convention addressing the response to the
present climate threat. Because the greenhouse effect is of a global na-
ture, treaties on marine pollution," the Convention on Long Range
Transboundary Air Pollution,7 4 the Antarctic Treaty,75 conventions on
protecting the ozone layer, 76 and treaties on outer space 7 art, useful
guides, because they regulate the global commons-areas which have
no international borders.
These treaties reveal legal principles which could be applied to the
consequences of the greenhouse threat: the recognition of the trans-
boundary nature of pollution;78 the right of states to preserve their nat-
ural resources;79 the obligation of states to protect the environment and
73. Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 69; Convention for the Prevention of
Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, done at Paris, Feb. 21, 1974, ST/LEG/
SER.B/18 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 352 (1974) [hereinafter Convention on
Marine Pollution].
74. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 10, 541 [hereinafter Convention on Transboundary Air Pollution]. The
convention was adopted within the framework of the Economic Commission for Europe
on the Protection of the Environment. Id. at 3. It established the means by which the
contracting parties shall exchange information, consultation, research and monitoring
in order to develop policies and strategies to combat long-range transmissions of air
pollutants. Id. at 4, art. 3.
75. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780. The signato-
ries agreed inter alia, to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation, to
prevent militarization, and to prohibit any nuclear explosions or disposal of radioactive
waste in Antarctica. Id. at 795-96.
76. Vienna Convention, supra note 16; Montreal Protocol, supra note 16.
77. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, opened for signature Jan. 25, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. The treaty
recognizes the common interest of all mankind in the "exploration and use of outer
space for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or social
development." Id. at 207. Article IX provides that parties to the treaty shall conduct
their activities in outer space "so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also
adverse changes in the environment of the Earth." Id. at 209-10, art. IX.
78. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 16, at 1530 (recognizing that world-wide
discharges of certain substances can significantly deplete the stratospheric ozone layer);
see also Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 69 (recognizing that countries shall
take all measures necessary to guarantee that their activities do not cause damage by
pollution to other countries and their environments); Convention on Transboundary Air
Pollution, supra note 74, at 4 (defining long-range transboundary air pollution).
79. See Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 69, at 1308 (stating that coun-
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the corresponding state liability for pollution; 80 cooperation in the sci-
entific, technical, and legislative fields; 81 the requirement to use mea-
sures of a predetermined standard to combat pollution;82 the recogni-
tion that imminent damage is as significant as actual damage; 83 the
requirement to study alternate measures for attaining environmental
objectives;84 the recognition of the importance of assistance to develop-
ing states;85 the requirement of environmental impact assessments; 80
and the importance of monitoring, enforcdment, and education. 7 A
number of the emerging principles find further expression in the World
Commission Experts Group Report, namely:88
tries have a sovereign right to exploit their natural resources).
80. See id. at 1308, 1315-16 (recognizing the obligation of countries to protect and
to preserve the marine environment); see also Convention on Marine Pollution, supra
note 73, at 360 (emphasizing each country's responsibility to prevent, minimize, and
eliminate pollution from land-based sources).
81. See Vienna Convention, supra note 16, at 1530 (directing cooperation in legal,
scientific, and technical fields); see also Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 69,
at 1309 (mandating cooperation in studies, research programs, and exchange of infor-
mation and data); Convention on Transboundary Air Pollution, supra note 74, at 4
(stating that countries shall initiate and cooperate in research and development).
82. See Vienna Convention, supra note 16 (obligating countries to cooperate in the
formulation of agreed measures, standards, and procedures); see also Convention on
Law of the Sea, supra note 69, at 1309 (providing that countries shall cooperate in
establishing appropriate scientific criteria); Convention on Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion, supra note 74, at 6 (stressing the need to use comparable or uniform procedures
for monitoring the long-range transmission of air pollutants).
83. Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 69, at 1309, art. 198.
84. See id. at 1309-20 (requiring countries to take other necessary measures to
prevent, reduce, and control pollution); see also Convention on Marine Pollution, supra
note 73, at 359 (mandating that countries establish joint programs of scientific and
technical research to determine the best methods of reducing marine pollution from
land-based sources).
85. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 16, at 1555-56 (entitling developing coun-
tries to delay compliance with control methods for ozone depletion); see also Vienna
Convention, supra note 16, at 1531 (ensuring that developing nations receive informa-
tion on alternative technologies and equipment, necessary equipment and facilities for
research, and training of scientific personnel); Convention on Law of the Sea, supra
note 69, at 1309 (granting preferential treatment for developing countries in the alloca-
tion of funds, technical assistance, and specialized services).
86. See Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69, at 1309 (requiring an
assessment of the potential effects when countries believe that their planned activities
may cause substantial pollution or harmful changes to the marine environment).
87. See id. (providing that countries shall monitor the risks or effects of pollution);
see also Convention on Transboundary Air Pollution, supra note 74, at 6-7 (discussing
the monitoring and evaluation of long-range transmission of air pollutants).
88. WORLD COMMISSION ONENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 215 (1987). The World Commission on
Environment and Development is an independent body, established in 1983, that is
linked to, but outside the control of, governments and the UN system. The Commis-
sion's mandate includes three objectives: to reexamine the critical environment and de-
velopment issues and to formidable realistic proposals for dealing with them; to propose
new forms of international cooperation on these issues that will influence policies and
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" that every human being has a fundamental right to a healthy environment;
" that states shall conserve the environment for the benefit of present and future
generations;
* that states shall maintain ecosystems and ecological processes essential for the
functioning of the biosphere;
- that states shall use transboundary and global natural resources in a reasonable
and equitable manner;
• that states shall prevent or abate any transboundary pollution which causes or
could cause significant harm;
- that states may carry out or permit certain dangerous but beneficial activities
provided they take all reasonable precautionary measures to limit the risk and
ensure that compensation is provided should substantial transboundary harm oc-
cur, and provided that states shall ensure that compensation is provided for sub-
stantial transboundary harm resulting from activities which were not known to
be harmful at the time they were undertaken;
• that states shall cooperate in good faith with other states to achieve optimal use
of transboundary and global natural resources and effective prevention or abate-
ment of transboundary environmental interferences;
- that states shall provide prior notification and assessment of planned activities
which may have significant transboundary effect; and
- that states shall cease activities which breach an international obligation re-
garding the environment and provide compensation for harm caused.89
The principle of a right to an adequate environment expressed in the
World Commission Experts Group Report is also found in The Decla-
ration of the Hague.90 The Hague Declaration begins by recognizing
that "the right to live is the right from which all other rights stem.
Guaranteeing this right is the paramount duty of those in charge of all
states throughout the world.""' The right to life is not a new invention.
As a well established international legal right, states have a duty to
recognize that any activity which threatens that right would be an in-
ternational legal wrong.92
events in the direction of needed changes; and to raise the levels of understanding and
commitment to action of individuals, voluntary organizations, businesses, institutes and
governments. Id. at 1.
89. Id. at 25-27.
90. DECLARATION OF THE HAGUE, Mar. 11, 1989, reprinted in SELECTED LEGAL
MATERIALS, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y. 567 (1990) [hereinafter DECLARATION OF
THE HAGUE. The Hague Declaration was clearly, designed to be a grand statement of
political intent couched in the language of law, as the following demonstrates:
[b]ecause of the nature of the dangers involved, remedies to be sought involve
not only the fundamental duty to preserve the ecosystem, but also the right to
live in dignity in a viable global environment, and the consequent duty of the
community of nations vis-a-vis present and future generations to do all that can
be done to preserve the quality of the atmosphere.
Id.
91. Id.
92. The right to a healthy environment has emerged as one of the solidarity or
third generation human rights. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of Rights
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As discussed above, the legal principles which could be applied as
evidence of emerging customary international law in the field of the
environment in general and to global warming in particular include: the
1972 Stockholm Declaration, the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Pro-
tection of the Ozone Layer, the 1987 Montreal Protocol, and the U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 43/53 on the Protection of the Global
Climate in 1988. In addition, there is further documentary evidence of
customary law being developed as part of the current effort to assess
global warming and develop an appropriate international legal response
which will assist in identifying the content, nature, and scope of any
customary international rule. 3 Whether or not these impressive sources
will be accepted as a customary rule of international law is not clear;
that decision will ultimately be made by the ICJ.
3. Procedural Routes in the ICJ
There are three basic procedural routes open to states wishing to use
the international legal process to establish liability in the manner dis-
cussed above, for bringing litigation in the ICJ: a contentious case,
where both parties have submitted to the jurisdiction of the ICJ; a case
submitted to the court by special agreement of the parties (a compro-
mise); and a request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ."
An example of a contentious case is one brought by Nicaragua
against the United States. 5 In this type of case, the defendant can
withdraw from the jurisdiction of the ICJ on the grounds that the issue
is essentially political and, therefore, not suitable for judicial resolution.
of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 A~i. U.L. REv. 1, 59-61 (1982); Alston, A
Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of
International Human Rights Law?, 29 NE'H. INT'L L. REV. 307 (1982); Marks,
Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980's ?, 33 RUtrGERS L. REV.
435, 441-45 (1981); Gormley, The Right to a Safe and Decent Environment, 28 IN-
DIAN J. INT'L L. 1 (1988).
93. See infra notes 99-167 and accompanying text (discussing the preparatory
work being done for a framework convention on global warming). Of particular rele-
vance are the recent U.N. Resolutions on climate change and sea-level rise, and the
recent declarations issued at the Hague, Langkawi, Mal6 and Noordwijk.
94. See U.N. CHARTER art. 96 (discussing the circumstances under which the ICJ
will hear a case).
95. Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27, 1986). The Nicaraguan government brought
suit against the United States for violating international law by supporting Contra
rebels who mined Nicaraguan harbors and who were seeking to overthrow the
Sandinista government. Id. The United States, after the Court decided it had jurisdic-
tion to hear the claim, withdrew from further proceedings. Id. In terminating its ac-
ceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the United States acknowledged
that it would accept the jurisdiction of the Court in mutually submitted disputes. Id.
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Contentious cases are fraught with difficulty. The jurisdictional rules of
the ICJ favor reluctant defendant states, the evidentiary burden on a
plaintiff state is great both in terms of law and fact, and the cost of
such actions is considerable. The likelihood is that unless they were to
receive the assistance of pro bono counsel, the states which will be the
most immediate victims of sea-level rise and the associated impacts of
global warming could not afford to bring an action against a developed
state which had allegedly caused the problem unless they could be near
certain of success. Scientific knowledge on global warming, while ad-
vanced and quickly developing, might struggle to meet the legal stan-
dards of causation to find liability in any one state.
Attempting to fashion a global warming case that could be submit-
ted to the ICJ by special agreement may be a less difficult option. This
requires that the parties agree to submit an existing dispute to the
court, thereby accepting its jurisdiction for that particular case. It is
also possible for a state to institute an action in the ICJ even though
the opposing party has not recognized the jurisdiction of the Court, and
then invite the defendant to submit to jurisdiction. Although no such
case has ever succeeded in bringing an unwilling defendant before the
ICJ, it allows the aggrieved party the opportunity to file the case re-
sulting in the attendant political benefits, which are well known to envi-
ronmental litigators in the United States. Often, simply filing a case
can shame a defendant into action. Furthermore, international law op-
erates continually in the political arena and can be used to encourage
the political settlement of disputes, much as litigation in domestic
courts can be used to focus the attention of legislators on the problem
involved in the litigation.
Finally, advisory opinions may be requested by twenty-two different
organs and agencies of the United Nations. 6 Although the United Na-
tions Environment Programme (UNEP) is not yet included within this
group, advisory opinions can be requested by the Trusteeship Council,
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the World Health
Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
and the International Maritime Organization, among others. In the
current international political arena it is not entirely fanciful to imag-
ine one of these organizations-perhaps even the General Assembly it-
self-having sufficient interest to ask for an opinion from the ICJ.
9 7
96. See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 49 (explaining which U.N. bodies may request
advisory opinions).
97. Evidence of this interest can be found at the March 1989 conference that pro-
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As there is little precedent for a claim of the nature and scope sug-
gested here, an advisory opinion or a case submitted by special agree-
ment would be preferable to a contentious action. Furthermore, the
costs of an advisory opinion or a case submitted by special agreement
are substantially lower than those of a contentious action because the
organization or state which brings the action does not necessarily have
to prove a causal connection between the activities of one state and
damage suffered by another. The costs of investigating, bringing, and
examining evidence would, therefore, be considerably reduced.
The goal of an advisory opinion or a case submitted by special agree-
ment would be a declaration of law aimed at creating a structure for a
new regime of global environmental protection. The new regime should
make preventative action a priority, but should also provide for liability
and compensation for the consequences of global warming. The Court
might even be persuaded to support a declaration of law with a ruling
that the activities revealed by the evidence as causing global warming
should be ceased, limited, controlled, or compensated. The Court might
even address how the cost of any urgent remedial actions should be
allocated among particular states or international organizations funded
by states.
In sum, at the initiative of the low-lying developing states, an advi-
sory opinion could be sought by one of the eligible U.N. organs to es-
tablish the customary international legal principles applicable to global
warming and sea-level rise, or the low-lying developing states could
fashion a case to be submitted by special agreement. While it is not
certain that customary international law has evolved sufficiently to ad-
dress the problem adequately, an opinion from the ICJ clarifying the
limits of current law would contribute to the foundation of interna-
tional law and provide persuasive evidence of the rules and principles
binding the whole of international society. Such an opinion would have
the power to guide and direct the behavior of states in the future, and
would prove useful in the negotiation of a global framework convention.
B. PARTICIPATING IN THE CONVENTION PROCESS
In addition to pursuing an action in the ICJ, low-lying developing
states have another opportunity for using the international legal process
to ensure that appropriate consideration is given to their special vulner-
ability to sea-level rise and other impacts of global warming. They can
participate in the up-coming convention process on global warming,
duced the Hague Declaration. Supra note 90.
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and prepare their own draft of the convention to reflect their unique
concerns. To do this, the low-lying developing states will find it useful
to understand the current preparatory efforts already underway. They
will then need to marshal the relevant scientific and legal expertise, and
design their own negotiating strategy. Developing states might be as-
sisted in this process by both the more developed states, and NGOs.
1. Preparatory Work for a Framework Convention
a. U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Vienna Conven-
tion Model
The principal preparatory work for the drafting of a global climate
change convention is being undertaken under the auspices of the
United Nations. The Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol"8
are being looked to as relevant models. In December 1988, the General
Assembly unanimously passed a special resolution initiated by Malta
and supported by nineteen other states, calling for the adoption of a
framework convention on climate change. 9 The resolution called upon
UNEP, the WMO, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) 10 immediately to initiate action leading, possibly
within the next eighteen months, to a comprehensive review and recom-
mendations with respect to: (a) the state of knowledge of the science of
climate and climatic change, special emphasis on global warming; (b)
programmes and studies of the social and economic impact of climate
change particularly global warming; (c) possible policy responses by
Governments and others to delay, limit or mitigate the impact of ad-
verse climate change; (d) relevant treaties and other legal instruments
dealing with climate; (e) elements for possible inclusion in a future in-
ternational convention on climate.
The target date for completing the IPCC's initial assessment is Sep-
tember 1990, prior to the Second World Climate Conference to be held
in Geneva, Switzerland, in November 1990. The goal is to complete a
framework convention on climate change no later than the twenty-year
Stockholm review conference to be held in San Paolo, Brazil in June
98. Vienna Convention, supra note 16; Montreal Protocol, supra note 16.
99. U.N. Resolution on the Protection of the Global Climate, G.A. Res. 43/53,
A/RES/43/53 (Jan. 27, 1989), reprinted in SELECTED LEGAL MATERIALS 5 AM. U.J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 525 (1990) [hereinafter U.N. Resolution 43/53] (stating that the
General Assembly "[r]ecognizes that climate change is a common human concern be-
cause climate is an essential condition that sustains life on earth") (emphasis original).
100. The IPCC was established in November 1988 by UNEP and WMO "to carry
out internationally co-ordinated scientific assessments of the magnitude, timing and po-




The IPCC has established three main working groups to carry out its
mandate: Working Group I, chaired by the United Kingdom, is respon-
sible for assessing available scientific information on climate change;
Working Group II, chaired by the Soviet Union, is responsible for as-
sessing the environmental and socio-economic impacts of climate
change; and Working Group III, chaired by the United States, is re-
sponsible for formulating response strategies. 02
The drafting of the list of elements for a framework convention on
climate change is being done by Working Group III, the Response
Strategies Working Group. The United Kingdom, Canada, and Malta
oversee legal matters within this group and have particular responsibil-
ity for coordinating and directing the drafting. An initial draft of possi-
ble elements for a framework convention was produced for the plenary
meeting of the IPCC in October 1989.103
At the October 1989 meeting of the Working Group III, there was
"[full] support for a framework convention" on climate change "based
on [the] format of [the] Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer," which has both a framework convention setting forth
general principles and a series of specific protocols including the Mon-
treal Protocol. 10 4 Working Group III also acknowledged its "[fiull sup-
101. See, e.g., NoORDWIJK DECLARATION FOR THE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON
ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTION AND CLIMATE CHANGE, held in Noordwijk, The Nether-
lands on Nov. 7, 1989, reprinted in SELECTED LEGAL MATERIALS 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 592 (1990), para. (29) 5 [hereinafter NOORDWIJK DECLARATION) (stating
that the Conference "[uIrges all involved ... to do their utmost ... to ensure adoption
of the convention as early as 1991 if possible and no later than at the Conference of the
United Nations on Environment and Development in 1992") (emphasis in original); Id.
para. (29) 1 (stating that the Conference
"[urges all countries to join and intensify the ongoing work within UNEP and
WMO through the IPCC with respect to the compilation of elements for a
framework convention on climate change so that negotiations upon it can start as
soon as possible after the adoption of the interim report of the IPCC")
(emphasis in original).
102. U.N. Resolution 43/53, supra note 99, para. 21.
103. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, REPOR1 OF THE SECOND
SESSION OF IPCC WORKING GROUP Ill/RESPONSE STRATEGIES WORKING GROUP i,
sec. 2, held in Geneva, Switzerland on Oct. 2-6. 1989 [hereinafter RESPONSE STRATE-
GIES] IPCC LIST OF ELEMENTS, reprinted in Appendix A. (listing the possible elements
for inclusion in a framework convention on climate change).
104. See WMO/UNEP/IPCC Working Group III (RSWG) Second Session, Ge-
neva, 2-6 Oct. 1989, Legal Measures and Processes: Synopsis of Contributions (sub-
mitted by Chairman Working Group III, Dr. F. M. Bernthal) at 2-5 [hereinafter Legal
Measures Synopsis]. At the October meeting in Geneva, the Response Strategies
Working Group supported a dual track approach, whereby specific protocols with spe-
cific reduction goals and timetables would be pursued at the same time as a framework
convention. Id.
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port" to establish within a framework convention "general principles
and obligations with respect to climate change" and "institutional
framework and mechanisms to monitor and assess climate change, and
manage the responses"; and to "take into account the needs, technolog-
ical and financial, of developing countries."'""
The draft of possible elements includes an explicit statement that
"[s]ome of the proposed elements are controversial, some were in fact
objected to, but all have been included to stimulate discussion at the
national and international levels."'0 6 For example, while Working
Group III contributors agreed on the need to establish "a secretariat
and Conference of the Parties on the lines of the Vienna Convention,"
a number of countries also suggested "an Executive Committee of the
Conference, and establishment of some new authority to monitor imple-
mentation."' ° One country objected to "a new institution," and there
was a predictable "lack of consensus" on the powers to be given to
"whatever body is responsible [for] implementation."' 1 8 There also wag
"no clear consensus" about "the particular financial provisions" needed
to assist developing countries, although there was "widespread accept-
ance of the importance of recognizing the particular needs of develop-
ing countries."'1 9 Similarly, there were "differing views" on the timing
for specific protocols on CO2 and other greenhouse gases; some states
wanted protocols to follow the convention, and others wanted specific
undertakings in the framework convention, specifically on CO2
emissions. 110
The IPCC's effort has been endorsed by the United Kingdom;' the
105. Id. at 1-2, para. A(2).
106. See RESPONSE STRATEGIES, supra note 103, sec. 3.
107. Legal Measures Synopsis, supra note 104, at 4-5, para. B (4)(d)(i).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 5, para. B4(d)(iii) (emphasis omitted).
110. Id. at 5-6, para. B4(e)(ii).
111. See Address by Sir Crispin Tickell, Statement of the Permanent Representa-
tive to the U.N. from the United Kingdom to ECOSOC (May 8, 1989). Sir Tickell
commented that:
First we believe that we should seek to establish as soon as possible a simple
framework or umbrella convention, which would set out general principles and
guidelines. In doing so we could follow the precedent set by the Vienna Conven-
tion of 1985 on the ozone layer. The drafting of principles and guidelines for
good climate behavior.. .is a task clearly falling to the Inter-governmental Panel
on Climate Change ....
Secondly we should fit specific Protocols into the framework as scientific evi-
dence requires and permits.... In this fashion we could establish arrangements
sufficiently flexible to make early progress on problems which might otherwise
prove intractable.
Id.; see also Text of a Speech Made by the Prime Minister The Rt. Hon. Margaret
Thatcher FRS MP on the Global Environment to the United Nations General Assem-
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Council of the European Community in its resolution of June 21,
1989;112 the Heads of State or government of the "Group of 7" major
industrial nations, and the President of the Commission of the Euro-
pean Committees at the Paris Summit of the Arch, held on July 16,
1989;113 the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth meeting held
in Langkawi, Malaysia, on October 21, 1989;114 the 68 States which
attended the Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Cli-
mate Change held at Noordwijk, the Netherlands, on November 6,
1989;115 the small coastal and island states meeting held in Male, Re-
public of Maldives, on November 14-18, 1989;111 the participants at
the Tokyo Conference on the Global Environment and Human Re-
sponse Toward Sustainable Development, on September 11-13, 1989,117
bly 6,8 (Nov. 8, 1989). [hereinafter Thatcher UN Speech].
112. Council Resolution, O.J. EUR. COMMNI. (No. C. 183) 4 (June 21, 1989). The
Resolution:
INVITES the Commission and the Member States [of the EEC] to take urgent
action to increase energy savings; to improve energy efficiency; to promote the
development and use of energy sources, such as nonfossil fuels, which will not
contribute to the greenhouse effect; and to give high priority to the development
and introduction in the Member States of the innovative commercially viable
technologies in these fields. In this context due account must be taken of safety
aspects, security of supply, environmental impact, public health and economic
consideration.
Id. The June 21, 1989 Council Resolution indicates support for many legal principles
important for a climate change convention, and invites the Commission to propose
measures to address the greenhouse gas emissions in a report by the end of 1990. Id.
The principles include the use of energy alternatives and cfficiency; the need to consider
environmental impact; aid to developing countries to reconcile constraints stemming
from climate change with their developmental goals; the importance of research to un-
derstand climate change; co-ordination of activities worldwide; and education and citi-
zen involvement. Id.
113. ECONOMIC DECLARATION, SUMMIT OF THE ARCH, para. 40 (July 16, 1989),
reprinted in SELECTED LEGAL MATERIALS, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 571 (1990)
(stating that "[w]e strongly support the work undertaken by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change").
114. THE LANGKAWI DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT, held in Langkawi, Malay-
sia on Oct. 21, 1989, reprinted in SELECTED LEGAL MATERIALS, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L. &
PoL'Y 589, para. 8 (1990) [hereinafter LANGKAWI DECLARATION] (committing the
Heads of Government of the Commonwealth to "support the work of the UNEP/
WMO Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change... [and] applaud[ing the efforts
of member governments to advance the negotiation of a framework convention under
UN auspices").
115. NOORDWIJK DECLARATION, supra note 101, para. 4 (stating that "it is now
time for governments of all countries to commit themselves to the IPCC").
116. MALf DECLARATION, supra note 11, at 603 (stating that the IPCC "is recog-
nized as the main forum for the on-going work on science, impacts and response strate-
gies of climate change").
117. TOKYO CONFERENCE STATEMENT ON THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND
HUMAN RESPONSE TOWARD SUSTAINABLE GROWTH, held in Tokyo, Japan on Sept. I I-
13, 1989, reprinted in SELECTED LEGAL MATERIALS, 5 Am. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
577, III.(a) (1990) [hereinafter TOKYO CONFERENCE STATEMENT] (stating that "[a]s
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and those at the World Conference on Preparing for Climate Change
held in Cairo, Egypt, on December 21, 1989.1
Although the IPCC process is increasingly being relied upon as the
appropriate international forum for debating the impacts of and re-
sponses to global warming, the difficulty of achieving agreement on
specific issues is only just beginning. These difficulties include not only
the "differing views" within the IPCC's Working Group III, but also
the failed efforts to get the Noordwijk Ministerial Conference to en-
dorse a specific cut in CO2 emissions to stabilize them at 1988 levels by
the year 2000. Such an agreement was blocked by the United States,
the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and Japan,"' with the United
States indicating that it needed the results of the IPCC's science re-
port-due by September 1990-before making such a commitment.120
As a result, the final Noordwijk Declaration did not include a specific
reduction in CO2 emissions but stated only that the industrialized na-
tions "agree that such stabilization should be achieved by them as soon
as possible, at levels to be considered by the IPCC and the Second
World Climate Conference of November 1990. .. ,[and that in] the
view of many industrialized nations such stabilization of CO2 emissions
should be achieved as a first step at the latest by the year 2000.11121
b. Toronto Conference: "Law of the Atmosphere" Model
In addition to the IPCC effort, other preparatory work has been un-
dertaken to develop a comprehensive "Law of the Atmosphere" con-
many countries as possible should be encouraged to participate in the activities of the
IPCC").
118. THE CAIRO COMPACT: TOWARDS A CONCERTED WORLD-WIDE RESPONSE TO
THE CLIMATE CRISIS, held in Cairo, Egypt on Dec. 21, 1989, reprinted in SELECTED
LEGAL MATERIALS, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 631, 632 (1990) [hereinafter CAIRO
COMPACT] (stating that "[t]o ensure success in these negotiations, governments should
give strong support to the vital work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change").
119. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, at 18.
120. See News: Noordwijk Meeting Outcome, Global Climate Change Dig., Dec.
1989, at 157 (stating that "[p]roposals to set a specific timetable for limiting emissions,
supported by Western Europe and other countries, were opposed by the United States,
Japan, Britain, and the USSR, which favor waiting until next fall for the outcome of
the. . . (IPCC) before making specific commitments"); see also Thatcher UN Speech,
supra note 111, at 6-7 (quoting Prime Minister Thatcher as saying, "[b]efore we act,
we need the best possible scientific assessment: otherwise we risk making matters
worse. . . . The United Kingdom has agreed to take on the task of coordinating such
an assessment within the [IPCC], an assessment which will be available to everyone by
the time of the Second World Climate Conference next year [1990]").
121. NOORDWIJK DECLARATION, supra note 101.
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vention, modeled loosely after the Law of the Sea.122 Under the leader-
ship of Canada, the Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere
in June 1988 called for a comprehensive framework convention and
protocols to protect the atmosphere.1 2'
Following the Toronto Conference, a "Meeting of Legal and Policy
Experts" was held in Ottawa, Canada, on February 20-22, 1989 to de-
velop possible elements for a convention-both a broad Atmospheric
Convention and a narrower Climate Change Convention.' 2' The State-
ment of the Legal and Policy Experts takes the position that, in addi-
tion to developing a climate change convention, "work on principles for
a framework convention on protection of the atmosphere should pro-
ceed." 125 The Statement sets forth 24 substantive and procedural ele-
ments that need to be addressed in a convention protecting the atmo-
sphere. 26 The Statement also addresses additional "considerations and
elements" for a specific convention on climate change. 2
7
The Law of the Atmosphere approach has been criticized for being
overly ambitious and slowing agreement on steps needed to begin re-
ducing greenhouse gas emissions. The British Ambassador to the UN,
Sir Crispin Tickell, has remarked that:
There are many here and elsewhere who would like to look forward to a Law of
the Atmosphere on the same lines as the Law of the Sea. To them I counsel
caution. The Law of the Sea conference was not a total success, and many gov-
ernments including those of the United States and Britain, could not accept the
results.... For the moment it would surely be better for international work to
begin without encumbering the debate with the apparatus of draft conventions
and treaty making. Instead, we should adopt a step by step approach.1"
The Law of the Sea took nine years to negotiate; seven years later it
still has not entered into force.1 29 In contrast, the Vienna Convention
122. TORONTO CONFERENCE STATEMENT, supra note 1.
123. Id. paras. 4 & 5.
124. PROTECTION OF THE ATiOSPHERE: INTERNATIONAL MEETING OF LEGAL AND
POLICY EXPERTS, held in Ottawa, Ontario on Feb. 20-22, 1989, reprinted in SELECTED
LEGAL MATERIALS, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 529 (1990) [hereinafter OTFOwA
STATEMENT OF LEGAL EXPERTS].
125. Id. para. (c).
126. Id. para. A.1.-24.
127. Id. para. B.1.-11.
128. Remarks of Sir Crispin Tickell, Proceedings of the Second North American
Conference on Preparing for Climate Change 4 (Dec. 6-8, 1988), Climate Institute,
Washington, D.C.; see T.A. Siddiqi, Towards a Law of the Atmosphere Using Con-
cepts from the Law of the Sea, Working Paf r No. 12, (Aug. 1988) (available from
the East-West Center, Univ. of Hawaii School of Law) (contending that "[tihe time is
ripe to take an approach similar to that for the Law of the Sea and call a global
conference to draw up a Law of the Atmosphere").
129. See Sand, supra note 52, at 10-11.
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and the Montreal Protocol were concluded relatively quickly, and im-
plementation of them is ahead of schedule.' 30 On the other hand, the
Montreal Protocol has been signed by only 46 out of more than 160
states and the ozone problem is still far from being solved, due in large
part to the lack of participation by developing states.' 3'
c. The Hague Declaration and Other Innovative Proposals
Although both the U.N.'s IPCC effort and the Toronto conference
are looking to familiar models for guidance, a more innovative, if not
revolutionary, approach has been taken in the Hague Declaration. 32 In
the words of French President Francois Mitterrand, the Declaration
implies "the idea of renouncing a bit of national sovereignty. . .. "133
The 24 heads of state signing The Hague Declaration agreed upon sev-
eral principles, including:
The principle of developing, within the framework of the United Nations, new
institutional authority, either by strengthening existing institutions or by creating
a new institution, which, in the context of the preservation of the earth's atmo-
sphere, shall be responsible for combating any further global warming of the
atmosphere and shall involve such decision-making procedures as may be effcc-
tive even if, on occasion, unanimous agreement has not been achieved.
13
4
The new institutional authority would "develop instruments and de-
fine standards to enhance or guarantee the protection of the atmo-
sphere and monitor compliance."' 135 The Hague signatories also agreed
upon the need for "appropriate measures to promote the effective im-
plementation of and compliance with the decisions of the new institu-
130. Id. at 11.
131. See Ramakrishna, Ensuring South's Participation, (paper presented at the
Meeting of the World Resources Institute Policy Panel on Responses to the Green-
house Effect and Global Climate Change) (Washington, D.C.: May 9-10, 1989) (ex-
plaining that "[a] recent study by WRI pointed out that even if nations follow the
Montreal Protocol to the letter, the net emissions of ozone depleting substances will rise
by 50% instead of a decrease by the same percent by the year 2000). This figure was
arrived at after calculating potential remitted use of CFCs in only four developing
countries: Brazil, China, India and Indonesia. Id.
132. DECLARATION OF THE HAGUE, supra note 90.
133. Cody, Global Environmental Power Sought, Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1987, at
A27. Then-Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway remarked about
GLOBE that "[tihe principles we have endorsed are in fact radical, but anything less
would not serve us." Id.
134. DECLARATION OF THE HAGUE, supra note 90, para. (a). The Hague Declara-
tion was signed by representatives from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Federal Re-
public of Germany, France, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jor-
dan, Kenya, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Senegal, Sweden, Tunisia,
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Id.
135. Id. para. (b).
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tional authority, decisions which will be subject to control by the Inter-
national Court of Justice." 136 Finally, the Hague Declaration included
the "principle that countries to which decisions taken to protect the
atmosphere shall prove to be an abnormal or special burden, in view,
inter alia, of the level of their development and actual responsibility for
the deterioration of the atmosphere, shall receive fair and equitable as-
sistance to compensate them for bearing such burden.13 1
The Hague signatories also discussed, though they did not formally
include in their declaration, a proposal by French, Dutch, and Norwe-
gian officials for a new organization referred to as "GLOBE," which
would have had among its powers that of imposing sanctions on states
violating its standards and decisions.1 38
Relying explicitly on The Hague Declaration, New Zealand also has
called for the creation of a new institution to deal with climate
change-an Environmental Protection Council.13 9 The proposed Coun-
cil would not replace UNEP or other existing organizations, "but it
would have new functions making it the equivalent of a legislature...
[and] would be empowered to take binding decisions."1 40 The Hague
Declaration also envisaged judicial controls to be used in securing com-
pliance with binding decisions. 41
Although it did not go as far as The Hague Declaration, the
Noordwijk Ministerial Conference took note of the need for "appropri-
ate decision making procedures and powers."142 The Noordwijk Con-
ference also recognized that the effort to draft a climate change con-
vention would benefit from considering not only the "relevant aspects of
the Vienna Convention," but also "innovative approaches as may be
required by the complex character of the problem." ' "3
One such innovative proposal is to establish a trusteeship for the
global commons, including the atmosphere, by restructuring the U.N.
Trusteeship Council. Maurice Strong, the President of the World Fed-
eration of United Nations Associations, has noted that "ecological is-
136. Id. para. (c).
137. Id. para. (d).
138. Cody, supra note 133, at A27, A33.
139. New Zealand Delegation Comments to IPCC, IPCC/WG3-l1/Doc.2, in Re-
port of the Second Session of IPCC Working Group Ill/Response Strategies Working
Group (RSWG) I (Oct. 2-6, 1989) [hereinafter New Zealand Delegation Comments to
IPCC]; see General Debate Statement at the 44th Session of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly, at 13-14 (Oct. 2, 1989), (statement of The Right Honorable Geoffrey
Palmer, Prime Minister of New Zealand).
140. New Zealand Delegation Comments to IPCC, supra note 139.
141. Id. at 3.
142. NOORDWIJK DECLARATION, supra note 101.
143. Id.
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sues bear upon the security of our entire planet and the survival of its
inhabitants . .. [and are] closely related to the management of the
global commons, the oceans, the atmosphere, and outer space. ' 144 In
light of this, Mr. Strong has suggested that the U.N. Trusteeship
Council could be "revitalized, given a new mission and a new mandate
as the forum within which the nations of the world exercise their trus-
teeship for the integrity of the planetary systems on which our security
and survival depends, as well as for the global commons.' If such
functions were added to its mission, the Trusteeship Council "could
make an extremely important contribution to the capacity of the
United Nations to act as the principal instrument through which the
nations of the world cooperate to ensure their common security.'
' 4
III. PARTICIPATION BY DEVELOPING STATES IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSE TO GLOBAL
WARMING
Global warming is, by definition, a global problem that will ulti-
mately require a global solution. It demands the full participation of
the developed states, who historically have been responsible for the
bulk of the greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere,147 and the
developing states, who are continually increasing their contribution to
the problem of global warming.' 48 If developing states do not fully par-
ticipate in formulating the international response to global warming,
including the current effort to draft a framework convention, and do
not become parties to an international agreement, they will continue to
rely on the wasteful technologies that are significantly contributing to
144. Address by Maurice F. Strong, National Conference on "Peacemaking and
Peacekeeping: Canada and the United Nations," Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova
Scotia, June 5, 1988, at 17 (on file at the office of the American University Journal of
International Law and Policy).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Rind, A Character Sketch of Greenhouse, 15 EPA J. 4, 7 (1989) (declar-
ing that the United States, for example, is responsible for 21 % of the total annual
contribution of greenhouse gases, the Soviet Union 14%, and the European Economic
Community Countries 14%, for a total of 49%); TORONTO CONFERENCE STATEMENT,
supra note I (stating that while climate change is caused by prosperous nations, the
effects are suffered most acutely by the poor).
148. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY OPTIONS FOR STA-
BILIZING GLOBAL CLIMATE, No. IX 6 (draft report to Congress) (Feb. 1989) [herein-
after POLICY OPTIONS FOR STABILIZING GLOBAL CLIMATE] (setting out the contribu-
tion of greenhouse gases by geographic region). The contribution expected from the
developing states if development continues as planned and no action is taken to reduce
greenhouse gases is 42% of the total annual contribution by the year 2000, and 56%




As demonstrated by the IPCC and the many strongly-worded decla-
rations and conference statements discussed above, the community of
advanced industrialized states clearly recognizes the threat posed by
global warming, and increasingly, the need to gain the participation
and agreement of the developing states.
Despite this recognition, however, the vast majority of the developing
states are not yet participating in the preparatory work for a frame-
work convention. UNEP Director Dr. Mostafa Tolba noted that in
"many developing countries there is a lack of awareness among govern-
ments of the problems we are going to face" from global warming,
which "stems partly from the fact that developing countries lack the
facilities to collect the information on the global warming effect, and
partly from the inability of these countries to disseminate information
internally on what faces us unless we slow this effect down."' 1 4  Dr.
Tolba added that "financial and technical assistance, education, and
other concrete support mechanisms were needed immediately. . ." to
assist developing states, and that this "would necessitate large sums of
money."'150 He estimates $1,000,000 just for travel for five experts from
each of 20 priority states through the draft of the first report of the
IPCC. 151
In response to the problem, the IPCC recently established a Special
Committee on the Participation of Developing Countries.5 2 The Com-
mittee's initial recommendations, which have been endorsed by the
IPCC, include travel support for invited experts, "crash seminars" for
opinion leaders in developing countries, and the establishment of na-
tional climate committees to integrate climate change into national de-
velopment planning. 53 The priority developing countries are to be se-
lected on the basis of how seriously they will be affected by global
warming and sea-level rise, whether national action can have a major
149. World Climate Change Report (BNA) 10-11 (Nov. 1989).
150. WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, at 2, (Nairobi,
June, 28-30, 1989), Report of the Second Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) [hereinafter Report of Second IPCC Ses-
sion]. Dr. Tolba also noted that "[e]ven if all of the pledges were paid, the expenses for
1989 would barely be covered; nothing would be left over for 1990." Id.
151. Id. Annex IV.
152. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Report of the First Session of
the IPCC Special Committee on the Participation of Developing Countries, Washing-
ton, D.C. (Feb. 5-7, 1990), IPCC-III/Doc. 5, IPCC/SCD-II/Doc. 2 (5--1990). The
Special Committee is comprised of representatives from Brazil, France, which serves as
the chair, India, Indonesia, USSR, Japan, Kenya, Norway, Saudia Arabia, and the
USA, as well as UNEP, WMO, and the IPCC itself. Id. Annex I.
153. Id. at 1, 2-6.
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impact on greenhouse emissions and storage, whether they have special
expertise, and whether they are centers of major regional projects with
participation from more than one state.1
5 4
Notwithstanding these plans, the preliminary but critical preparatory
meetings currently underway are proceeding largely without the devel-
oping states. For example, of the 43 states sending representatives to
the October 1989 meeting of the IPCC's Working Group III, which is
charged with the formulation of response strategies, fewer that half
were from developing states;155 and of the 23 states contributing to the
draft of the possible elements for a convention at the October meeting,
only the Maldives, Zimbabwe, and Libya can be characterized as less
developed.
Ironically, the otherwise welcome speed to develop a global warming
convention may prove to be a disadvantage-unless far greater effort is
made to gain the full and effective participation of developing states. It
is not enough for the developed world to "pay special attention" to the
developing states, nor to promise the transfer of technology and finan-
cial aid in the future.
What is needed is immediate assistance to enable the developing
states to participate in the international response to global warming, so
they can prepare their own response,156 and develop their own negotiat-
ing strategies (which may include using the ICJ, as well as preparing
their own draft convention). Many developing states, perhaps as many
as sixty, have neither a full-time foreign office or state department with
international legal experience, nor an expert on complex international
environmental issues, such as global warming. Similarly, many do not
have the scientific expertise to determine the validity of the current
models being used to predict global warming, nor to determine the ex-
pected impacts on their particular state, including the impacts of sea-
level rise.
Assuming they are able to participate fully in the convention process,
the developing states will have a remarkable, if not unparalleled, oppor-
154. Report of Second IPCC Session, supra note 150, at Annex IV, para. 2.
155. Report of the Second Session of IPCC Working Group III/Response Strate-
gies Working Group (RSWG) at para. 4.1.5 (Geneva, Oct. 2-6, 1989).
156. See TOKYO CONFERENCE STATEMENT, supra note 117. The Tokyo Conference
Statement calls for assistance to developing countries to ensure participation in the
climate change assessment process now underway by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) under the auspices of the UN. Id. at III (h)(i). The Tokyo
Conference Statement also calls for "(ii) adequate training of scientists and adminis-
trators .... (vi) effective analysis of regional impacts ... and the preparation of na-
tional and regional responses, and (vii) observation of their own climate and environ-
mental factors"). Id. at III (h)(ii),(vi) & (vii).
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tunity to address a wide range of important issues in the development
of any new international instrument on global climate change. The de-
veloping states, have already begun to identify their separate interests,
focusing on access to experts and technology, training of indigenous
experts, and financial assistance. Grants without conditions, rather than
loans, are desired, and in an amount that provides a net addition of
funds rather than a reprogramming of existing aid.
A central issue for many developing states will be how to obtain
compensation for the opportunity costs they will incur from foregoing
or altering their development.1 57 This compensation must include the
transfer of more efficient industrial technologies and sufficient financial
aid and debt relief to allow developing states to achieve sustainable
development."6 8
The suggestion that the developed world should immediately assist
the developing states acquire the scientific and legal expertise needed to
participate in the international legal process is based upon two assump-
tions. The first is that experts will be able to agree more quickly than
politicians on the necessary elements of a global warming convention,
and thus provide the foundation for political agreement, as suggested
by previous experience with measures to protect the ozone layer. The
second is that early and equitable participation by the developing states
in drafting and negotiating a global warming convention will increase
the possibility that they will ultimately accept the international
agreement.
If these assumptions are correct, the industrialized world will benefit
from providing aid to the developing nations because this aid will speed
the process for achieving an equitable framework convention on global
warming. The ultimate goal, of course, is not only the formation of a
convention, but a convention which is accepted by all of international
society. Full participation from the outset-by all of international soci-
ety-is the most certain way to achieve this goal.
157. See, e.g., DECLARATION OF THE HAGUE, supra note 90, para. (d) (stating that
mechanisms must be developed to compensate developing countries for taking on the
special burden of atmospheric deterioration).
158. In 1988 the WorldWatch Institute made rough estimates of additional cx-
penditures to meet essential targets for sustainable development by the year 2000: an-
nual expenditures of $46 billion by 1990, increasing to $145 billion annually in 1994,
and $150 billion in 2000. MacNeill, Strategies for Sustainable Economic Develop-
ment, Sci. Am., Sept. 1989, at 155, 162-64. This should be compared with the cost of
the worldwide reduction in agricultural productivity from the global warming that will
follow a doubling of CO2: the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates the annual net
cost to be from $35 to S170 billion. Passell, Economic Scene, Global Warming: Look
or Leap?, N. Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1990, at D2.
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CONCLUSION
The threat of global warming-a problem which eventually may
threaten the very survival of the planet and which, even now, threatens
global security-will severely test the international legal process.
Global warming is, by its nature, a problem involving all of interna-
tional society, as both emitters of greenhouse gases and as victims of
the consequences of these emissions. As such, its solution also must be
global, and involve all of international society.
While all states may contribute to global warming, the volume of
that contribution, and the attendant responsibility, is not equal. A
handful of the most industrialized states are responsible for the vast
majority of the greenhouse gases, other rapidly industrializing states
are adding considerable to the volume, while the small developing
states produce negligible greenhouse gases, rendering these states rela-
tively blameless.
Similarly, the ability to respond to global warming is not equal; the
highly industrialized states have the technology, expertise, and financial
might to reduce greenhouse gases and adapt to the consequences, while
many developing states have neither the technology, the expertise, nor
the financial ability for such response.
Finally, the impacts of global warming will not universally impact all
nations in similar ways. The low-lying island and coastal states will be
the earliest and hardest hit by global warming and the resulting sea-
level rise. Some are threatened with the loss of their entire territory,
while many others will lose part of their territory to erosion and peri-
odic flooding. These states potentially have a great deal to lose from
global warming and sea level rise, and much to gain from using the
international legal process. Indeed, there is little else they can do.
THE POTENTIAL OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS ^
One strategy for seeking protection and assistance is through the use
of the ICJ. Admittedly, the problems presented by global warming and
sea-level rise are beyond the scope of most issues historically considered
by the Court, but the world has changed (or rather, humankind has
changed it). As one author writes, we may be experiencing the "end of
nature" caused by global warming and other forms of environmental
degradation. 159 In order to face problems of the magnitude of global
159. See McKibben, Reflections: The End of Nature, NEw YORKER, Sept. 11,
1989, at 47, 50. Referring primarily to global climate change, the author writes that:
Our comforting sense, then, of the permanence of our natural world-our confi-
dence that it will change gradually and imperceptibly, if at all-is the result of a
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warming, established orthodoxies concerning the preeminent status of
the sovereign state are being challenged. This generalized political will
for change is affecting the international legal process as consciousness
evolves and as new meaning and purpose are given to international law
in a newly conceived international society.160
Under these circumstances, whether the ICJ can rise to the chal-
lenge to provide a forum for the resolution of global warming disputes
and protect the victim states vulnerable to sea-level rise is a serious
question. Although the possibility may be unlikely, the Court may be
willing and able to respond; indeed, it may even be willing to evolve as
an institution so that it may play a significant role in addressing the
planet's environmental problems. This option must be explored.
The Court cannot, however, act alone. Willing and creative states
must present a case, or one of the relevant U.N. organs must request
an advisory opinion, before the Court can act. This requires significant
scientific and legal expertise costing enormous sums of energy, time,
intellect, and money. For many of the small low-lying states, obtaining
this kind of assistance requires advocates and scientists to provide their
assistance pro bono or the Court to provide a legal aid fund."'1
Given such an opportunity, if the Court does not respond and evolve,
international society must carefully reconsider what judicial processes
and institutions are appropriate for addressing global warming and the
other inevitable international environmental threats that loom on the
horizon. A new International Environmental Court may be needed to
address the special problems of international and transboundary envi-
ronmental problems. In such a case, the ICJ would miss an opportunity
to carve for itself the central role in international society its supporters
have historically advocated. Other new institutions may also be needed
to deal effectively with the complexities of international environmental
problems. These institutions may include a global prosecutor or a trus-
tee of the global commons with the power to investigate and prosecute
environmental violations.
Even at the reaches of its evolutionary and creative possibilities to
resolve global warming disputes and similar international environmen-
subtly warped perspective. Changes in our world which can affect us can happen
in our lifetime-not just changes like wars but bigger and more sweeping events.
Without recognizing it, we have already stepped over the threshold of such a
change. I believe that we are at the end of nature.
160. P. ALLOTT, supra note 3.
161. To create a legal aid fund for the ICJ presumably would require an amend-
ment of the statute of the Court, and while such an amendment would be welcome,
finding political support from the current parties to the statute may be difficult at this
time.
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tal problems, the ICJ will play only a supporting role. Far more is
needed from the international legal process, and it can come only from
the creation of new legal principles and perhaps new institutions.
THE CONVENTION PROCESS
The most promising international response to global warming will be
found in the law-making function of the international legal process. A
global warming convention is essential, and, judging by the develop-
ments to date, inevitable in one form or another.
While much preparatory work has been done by the IPCC and other
bodies, as well as by conferences and meetings of experts, the actual
task of drafting and negotiating a global warming convention has not
formally begun.162 Under the circumstances, it seems far too early to
begin narrowing the options concerning relevant models or relevant in-
stitutional structures. Both the Vienna Convention and the Law of the
Sea should be considered as models for the Convention; the creation 6f
new institutions, including GLOBE, a trustee for the global commons,
and a new U.N. Environmental Protection Council should also be in-
cluded for discussion.1
63
Merely listing the elements for a framework convention, as the IPCC
is charged with doing, is of limited value. Rather, it is how those ele-
ments are stitched together into the whole of the framework convention
that will be important, and the ultimate acceptance of that whole.
162. The IPCC is charged with preparing a "list of elements" for a convention.
(Draft) Report of the Third Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), Feb. 1990, at 22, para. 3.3.12. The legal issues being ad-
dressed by Working Group III will continue to be refined until April 1, 1990, at which
time the Working Group hopes the legal issues paper will be available to provide "a
road-map for negotiation of the framework climate convention by laying out clearly
those issues that require negotiations." Id. para. 3.3.13.
As of the Third Plenary Session of the IPCC February 5-7, 1990:
There is consensus that, at a minimum, the convention should set forth principles
of co-operation, provide a legal and institutional framework for monitoring and
assessing climate change and for developing and implementing responses. The
convention and its protocols should deal with the special circumstances of devel-
oping countries, including mechanisms for providing financial assistance. Some
nations have suggested that binding commitments and control measures also be
included in a framework convention.
Id. at 21-22, para. 3.3.12.
The work on the convention, however, may be shifting from the IPCC process to the
process established under the 1992 Stockholm review conference, and ultimately of
course into the hands of the separate states. Id. at 15-16, para. 2.4.
163 See General Debate Statement at the 44th Session of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly, at 13-14 (Oct. 2, 1989) (statement of The Right Honorable Geoffrey
Palmer, Prime Minister of New Zealand) (proposing a new organ within the UN sys-
tem called the "Environmental Protection Council.")
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There are, nevertheless, two broad principles that should be empha-
sized-the precautionary principle and sustainable development. The
precautionary principle is designed to institutionalize caution and to en-
sure that society evaluates the threats it imposes on the environment
prior to adopting adverse actions. This principle must be coupled with
the principle of sustainable development, to help ensure the twin goals
of environmental protection and development. This is a daunting chal-
lenge. As the Prime Minister of New Zealand recently suggested to the
U.N. General Assembly:
"The UN even may need to consider the possibility that, within the
limitations of present technology, if development is to be sustainable, it
must be rationed. In other words: that humanity has reached the point
in history where sustainable development is only possible if "rights to
pollute are allocated.""" It is hoped that these two principles will be a
prominent part of any convention, and in general, any future develop-
ments in environmental law. In addition to limiting greenhouse gases,
and correcting the disturbances to our climate, we must ensure that
any such threats are not repeated.
As legal principles, such as those discussed above, are being selected
and given specific legal content and as new institutions are being de-
bated, states are forming negotiating compacts. These negotiating
blocks between various categories of states (for example, the most
highly industrialized states, the rapidly developing states, and the least
developed states), are being developed to establish group positions and
formulate and coordinate negotiating strategies.
The low-lying coastal and island states are increasingly recognized as
having a unique vulnerability to sea-level rise warranting separate con-
sideration in the convention process. There is general recognition that
financial assistance will have to be provided if these states are to par-
ticipate fully in the convention process. To date, however, there has
been little progress made toward providing such assistance for the low-
lying states-or for any of the other developing states in need of assis-
tance, and this does not bode well for the future. By being excluded, for
financial reasons, from the IPCC process, these states have less sense of
the urgency of the problem, less confidence in the scientific predictions
of global warming and specific impacts, a less informed citizenry, and
ultimately, less political will to tackle the issue in a framework
convention.
Many aspects of this problem might be solved with the assistance of
164. Id. at 11.
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NGOs. Public interest environmental organizations, which are accus-
tomed to providing their assistance pro bono, should be willing to offer
their assistance to developing states. Until international society pro-
vides environmental organizations with a larger and more official role
in the international legal process, including standing to bring actions in
the ICJ, such groups will find it to their advantage to work in partner-
ship with states. Assistance also might be provided by grant-making
institutions, law schools and universities, and private law firms, many
of whom have existing pro bono programs. Consulting firms with scien-
tific expertise and private corporations might also find avenues to help
assist developing countries. In summary, all of international society
must help find a solution.
Pro bono assistance will solve only part of the problem, however, as
the problem is not only how developing states can participate in the
process, but how they can be assisted in avoiding the wasteful develop-
ment paths taken by the more industrialized countries and how they
can be assisted in making the transition to sustainable development.
While perhaps $20 million would enable developing states to partici-
pate fully in the convention, it will take hundreds of billions of dollars
to help them achieve a sustainable society (and to adapt to the inevita-
ble consequences of the warming already underway). Furthermore, de-
veloped states should not assume these problems are strictly all "over
there," referring to the isolation of these problems in developing states.
The developed states must get their own house in order before their
calls for the developing countries to abandon the traditional develop-
ment path will carry any moral authority. Developed countries must
likewise pursue environmental protection and economic development
through limits imposed by the precautionary principle and sustainable
development.
The developed world has profited greatly from the industrialized
processes that cause global warming; it will have to use some of its
wealth to help the less economically advantaged states avoid and re-
duce their use of these wasteful technologies. As a start, developed na-
tions should immediately ensure the participation of the disadvantaged
states in the convention process. This relatively small gesture would
send a vital message of cooperation and partnership to the developing









5. Research and Systematic Observations
6. Information Exchange and Reporting
7. Technology Transfer
8. Consultation
9. Settlement of Disputes
10. Other Provisions
11. Annexes and Protocols
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TORONTO EXPERTS LIST OF ELEMENTS: FRAMEWORK
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4. Obligation to Protect and Preserve the Atmosphere
5. Sovereign Right of States to Permit Human Activities and the
Limits Thereto
6. Implementation of the Convention Through Protocols
7. Measures to Prevent, Reduce or Control
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19. Liability, Compensation or Other Relief
20. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
21. World Atmospheric Trust Fund
22. Co-ordination of Existing Institutional Arrangements
24. Participation in the Convention
APPENDIX C
TORONTO EXPERTS LIST OF ELEMENTS: ADDITIONAL










9. World Climate Trust Fund
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11. Nature of Obligations
